

Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

9 December 1958

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Briefing Today at 3:30 p.m.

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In checking about 2:30 with [REDACTED] offices to make certain that all is set for the briefing at 3:30, I learned that [REDACTED] secretary had expected me to confirm when the appointment was set up whereas I had thought our conversation was firm. Accordingly, I learned [REDACTED] is not available.

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In the light of the foregoing:

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a. Do you wish to proceed with [REDACTED] or

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b. Have me cancel with [REDACTED] which I can do if prior to 3 p.m., and try to rearrange another meeting.

Please check which you prefer.

Sorry for the confusion.

Ref: FC-02202/58 Draft 2 CCPC-D-5/58
December 8, 1958

Note: I think paragraph 1 should be a concise statement of the injunction in USIB-D-331/32, perhaps then followed by paragraph 1.

Paragraph 2: The CCPC recognizes that during the next eighteen months the CCPC believes that collection efforts need to be geared:

- a. To obtaining as much information as possible bearing upon operational deployment of ICBMs during the next eighteen months during which time it is anticipated that deployment sites will be under construction revealing information if observed not obtainable later on, and
- b. To keeping abreast of the development of long range developments which will become a permanent target for the most sophisticated of intelligence collection methods.

Accordingly, it recommends action to meet these two stages as follows:

a. For the immediate eighteen month period:

- 1) Seek permission for use of present overflight capability to obtain photography on areas most highly suspect for operational deployment and establishment of sites. (It should be recognized that we have no information which can conclusively guide us to where construction of sites or operational deployment is now taking place.)
- 2) Proceed with urgency to provide current ELINT gear (now in preparation) for obtaining maximum telemetry signals.
- 3) Request NSA to reallocate its resources for maximum assault on special intelligence relating to the guided missile program, reporting to the USIB extent to which other on-going programs will thereby suffer.

4) Concentrate clandestine efforts on seizing Soviet official known to have information bearing upon the guided missile program.

b. Longer range:

1) Undertake developmental work to ensure continuing photographic capabilities in spite of intensified Soviet air defense.

2) Develop plans for sophisticated exploitation of peripheral photographic and ELINT capabilities against guided missiles.